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ARTICLE
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:
MARYLAND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS, ALREADY
SUBJECT TO SEVERELY LIMITED VOIR DIRE, NOW ALSO
FACE THE PROSPECT OF ANONYMOUS JURIES
By: Nancy S. Forster·

T

he Maryland Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure is currently considering a request by the Maryland Circuit
Court Judges' Association for the adoption of a rule allowing the
empanelling of anonymous juries in both civil and criminal cases. I This
article addresses the impact that such a rule, if adopted, would have on
criminal defendants in Maryland, who already face severely limited voir
dire in jury selection.
Part I of this article traces the origin and development of anonymous
juries. An examination of the current status of voir dire in Maryland
criminal cases follows in Part II, with particular emphasis placed on the
many inconsistencies found in Maryland's appellate opinions regarding
voir dire. Part III of the article presents arguments against the use of
anonymous juries in Maryland criminal cases. Finally, Part IV highlights
the steps courts have taken to protect defendants' rights during
anonymous jury trials and, specifically, the importance that courts have
placed on the voir dire process in conjunction with the use of anonymous
juries. The article concludes with the suggestion that, should the use of
anonymous juries be permitted in Maryland, the voir dire process must be
expanded.

* Nancy S. Forster worked at the Maryland Office of the Public Defender for twentyfive years, the last five of which serving as the Public Defender for the State of Maryland.
During her career, Ms. Forster has argued and briefed cases on a range of criminal matters
before the Supreme Court of the United States and the appellate courts of Maryland. She is a
graduate of the University of Maryland, College Park, B.A., 1980, and the University of
Baltimore School of Law, J.D., 1985. Ms. Forster has been an Adjunct Professor at the
.
University of Baltimore School of Law since 2006.
I
Kristi Jourdan, Maryland, Virginia Mull Anonymous Juries, WASH. TIMES, July 26,
2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.comlnews/2009/ju1l26/maryland-virginiamull-anonyrnous-juries/printl.
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THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF ANONYMOUS JURIES

"Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom."

-William Pitr
In 1979, Leroy Barnes, along with ten other defendants, was convicted
of various federal narcotics violations in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, after a ten-week trial. 3 The
defendants were involved in the distribution of "massive quantities of
narcotics on the streets of Harlem and the South Bronx from which
enormous profits were realized.,,4 Before the trial, the judge announced
that, "in the interest of protecting the privacy of the jurors and their
families ... I have elected to maintain the anonymity of the jurorS.,,5 The
names, addresses and ethnicities of the prospective jurors were withheld
from both the prosecution and the defense. 6 In doing so, this case became
one of the first in the country to utilize an anonymous jury. 7
Before proceeding to discuss the gaining popularity of anonymous
juries, it is important to define precisely the term "anonymous jury." An
anonymous jury is one "in which specific identifying information about
the jurors-names, addresses, employer information, or other
information-[is] not disclosed to or permitted to be revealed by the
accused at trial."g Juror anonymity has varying degrees. 9 In some cases,
courts provide the parties with the names and places of residence of each
jury member but, in open court, identify the jurors by number rather than
name. to Anonymous juries may also involve "limited concealment"
when courts omit such information as the jurors' names and places of
employment, but the courts may reveal zip codes without exact
2 William Pitt, Speech in the House of Commons (Nov. 18, 1783), in OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 596 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., Oxford University Press 2009).
3 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121,121,131 (2d Cir. 1979).
4 ld. at 134.
5 ld. at 137.
6
ld.
7
Ted A. Donner & Richard K. Gabriel, JURY SELECTION STRATEGY AND SCIENCE
DATABASE § 7:6 (3d. ed. Nov., 2009) (recognizing Barnes as the "earliest reported appellate
court decision in which an 'anonymous jury' was identified"); see also Johnson v. United
States, 270 F .2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1959) (exact address of jurors could be concealed);
Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1959) (the court refused counsel's
request that each jury member state his or her name and address).
8
William D. Bremer, Annotation, Propriety of Using Anonymous Juries in State
Criminal Cases, 60 A.L.R. 5th 39, 45 (1998).
9 See United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (affirming the
withholding of jurors' names and addresses from the parties); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d
1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding concealment of jurors' names, addresses, places of
employment, spouses' names, and places of employment).
10
United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp 2d 880, 919 (N.D. Iowa, 2004) (outlining the
varying degrees of anonymity).
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addresses. I I Juries involve the highest degree of anonymity when courts
order that the "names, addresses, and places of employment of
prospective jurors and their spouses not be disclosed to counsel, either
before or after selection ofthe jury panel.,,12
The use of anonymous juries is on the rise, particularly in the federal
circuits J3 and in several states. 14 The common reason given for
empanelling an anonymous jury is the necessity to protect jurors from
intimidation or retaliation. 15 The problem for courts in empanelling
anonymous juries is, of course, the level of proof required to demonstrate
a real need for such protection, its potential for abuse, and the precautions
taken to protect the defendant's presumption of innocence and his right to
an impartial jury.
Demonstrating the Need for Anonymity

"Unquestionably, the empanelment of an anonymous jury is a drastic
measure, one which should be undertaken only in limited and carefully
delineated circumstances.,,16 The courts that have addressed this issue
require a "strong reason to believe the jury needs protection" to empanel
an anonymous jury. 17 The courts point to several factors in making this
determination:

See United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606,612 (5th Cir. 2002).
See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 970 (9th Cir. 2003).
13 See United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (lIth Cir. 1994); United States v. Crockett,
979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Byers, 603 F. Supp. 2d 826
(D. Md. 2009); United States v. Edmond, 730 F. Supp. 1144 (D.D.C. 1990).
14
See State v. Pennell, 583 A.2d 1348 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990); State v. Samonte, 928 P.2d
1 (Haw. 1996); Major v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Brown, 118
P.3d 1273 (Kan. 2005); State v. Yates, 2004 WL 795906 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Wren,
738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007); State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007);
State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628 (Utah 2007); State v.
Matos, 2004 WL 384208 (Wis. App. 2004); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, Ruling Incognito,
76 A.B.A. J. 20 (Feb. 1990).
15
United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1215 n.lO (7th Cir. 1992) (identifying the
empanelling of an anonymous jury as a "special precaution[] [which may] be taken in order to
protect jurors from harassment, intimidation, anxiety, and a host of other disruptive
influences").
16 United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (lIth Cir. 1994).
17
Jd. at 1519-20 (quoting United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir.
1991)); United States v. United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1215-17 (7th Cir. 1992);
Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183,1191-93 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359,
1362-65 (2d Cir. 1985); State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 385-87 (Minn. 2007); State v.
Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Ivy, 188 S.w.3d 132, 14344 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Britt, 553 N.W.2d 528, 531-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); see also
United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1021-26 (3d Cir. 1988); cf State v. Brown, 118 P.3d
1273,1279-81 (Kan. 2005) (requiring a "compelling reason").
11

12
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(1) the defendant's involvement in organized crime, (2) the
defendant's participation in a group with the capacity to harm
jurors, (3) the defendant's past attempts to interfere with the
judicial process, (4) the potential that, if convicted, the defendant
will suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary
penalties, and (5) extensive publicity that could enhance the
possibility that jurors' names would become public and expose
them to intimidation or harassment. 18
It would seem that only the third factor, "the defendant's past attempts to
interfere with the judicial process," presents a compelling reason for juror
anonymity because "past is often prologue.,,19 Indeed, it is this author's
contention that, unless there is evidence of the defendant's past attempts
to interfere with the judicial process, none of the other factors necessarily
compels anonymity of the jury. Otherwise, unless the courts are vigilant,
prosecutors could easily manipulate these other "factors." For example,
in United States v. Vario,2o the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stressed that,

[b ]efore a district judge may rely on the organized crime
connection of a defendant as a factor in the question of
anonymous juries, he must make a determination that this
connection has some direct relevance to the question of juror fears
or safety in the trial at hand, beyond the innuendo that this
connection conjures Up.21
It is paramount that judges should remain cautious in making certain that
the drastic measure of empanelling an anonymous jury is clearly
supported by compelling reasons relevant to the case at hand. If
Maryland courts were to empanel anonymous juries, however, even such
vigilance on behalf of a judge would not comport with a defendant's
constitutionally protected rights, as a result of Maryland's limited voir
dire.

18
United States v. Shryock, 342 FJd 948,971 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Darden,
70 F.3d 1507, 1532 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1520 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Byers, 603 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830 (D. Md. 2009); see also United States
v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 649 (7th Cir. 2002).
19
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act. 2, sc. 1.
20
943 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1991).
21
ld. at 241; see also State v. Accetturo, 619 A.2d 272,272,274-75 (N.J. Super. 1992)
(court denied the State's motion to empanel an anonymous jury where defendant was charged
"with conspiracy to commit racketeering as well as various acts of racketeering, including
thefts by extortion and the murder of an associate who refused to pay 'tribute' to a member of
the crime family").
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II. VOIR DIRE IN MARYLAND CRIMINAL CASES

"I consider trial by jury as the only anchor yet imagined by man, by
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution."
-Thomas Jefferson 22
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed.,,23 Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights likewise secures to the criminally accused of the
State the right "to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose
unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.,,24 The right to an
impartial jury, however, is rendered meaningless if the jury selection
process is so restrictive that it fails to exclude from the venire,25 also
known as the jury pool, those who may be biased against either party.
Voir dire is intended to provide that failsafe.
Literally translated, "voir dire" means "to speak the truth" and, as
applied to jury selection, is defined as "[ a] preliminary examination of a
prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is
qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.,,26 There is no statute or rule in
Maryland regulating the process of voir dire. Moreover, given the
stinginess of the appellate courts when ruling on the permissibility of
particular inquiries of the venire, it is questionable to say that voir dire in
Maryland truly serves its intended purpose. The reticence of the courts
regarding the kind of questions that defendants can ask on voir dire is the
result of the myopic view Maryland courts take of the purpose of voir
dire. This part of the article offers a review of Maryland's appellate court
opinions regarding voir dire, and demonstrates that, in addition to often
being inconsistent, they are singularly out of touch with the rest of the
nation.
Nearly every case in Maryland dealing with the propriety of asking
particular questions on voir dire recounts the "well-settled" common law,
that "[ q]uestions not directed to a specific ground for disqualification but
which are speculative, inquisitorial, catechizing[,] or 'fishing[,]' asked in

22
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 450 (John P. Foley ed., Funk &
WagnaUs Co. 1900).
23
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24
MD. CODE, CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 21 (2003).
25
Venire is defined as "[a] panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among
whom the jurors are to be chosen." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1694 (9th ed. 2009).
26 Id. at 17\0.
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the aid of deciding on peremptory challenges,27 may be refused in the
discretion of the court, even though it would not have been error to have
asked them.,,28 Thus, whether or not to ask a requested question on voir
dire is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of
that discretion is only limited when the requested question will reveal the
existence of cause for the juror's disqualification, in which case, the
question must be asked?9 There is simply no right in Maryland for
counsel to propound questions to a prospective juror if the purpose of the
questions is merely to aid counsel in his decision whether to exercise a
peremptory challenge. 3o Or, is there such a right?

A. The Origin: Handy v. State
Maryland cases developing the parameters of voir dire stretch back
over one hundred years and include the oft-cited case Handy v. State. 3l
Henry Handy stood trial for the murder of his wife. 32 After the venire
was sworn, counsel for Mr. Handy, on voir dire, wished to personally
question a juror instead of having the court ask the questions. 33 The court
refused counsel this opportunity, but made clear that counsel could recite
the questions to the court and the court would, in tum, ask them of the
juror. 34 Counsel took exception to this process, and voir dire continued. 35
Another member of the venire stepped forward, and, this time, defense
counsel requested the judge to ask if the gentleman was "a married
man.,,36 Counsel explained that he wished to have this question asked
because he "desired to enlighten [himself] as to the propriety of
27 A peremptory challenge is "[0 ]ne of a party's limited number of challenges that do not
need to be supported by a reason unless the opposing party makes a prima facie showing that
the challenge was used to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 261-62 (9th ed. 2009).
28
Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34-35, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (1993) (quoting McGee v. State,
219 Md. 53, 58-59, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959)); see, e.g., Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593, 602,
903 A.2d 922, 928 (2005); State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 220, 798 A.2d 566, 577 (2002);
Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 14, 759 A.2d 819,826 (2000); Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 293,
696 A.2d 443, 463 (1997); Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337,341,378 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1977);
Logan v. State, 164 Md. App. 1,60,882 A.2d 330, 363-64 (2005); McFadden v. State, 42 Md.
App. 720, 729,402 A.2d 1310,1314 (1979).
29 Goldstein v. State, 220 Md. 39, 45, 150 A.2d 900, 904 (1959).
"[The Court of
Appeals] has identified several areas of mandatory inquiry: racial, ethnic and cultural bias,
religious bias, predisposition as to the use of circumstantial evidence in capital cases, and
placement of undue weight on police officer credibility." Dingle v. State, 361 Md. I, 11 n.8,
759 A.2d 819, 824 n.8 (2006).
30
Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146,158,923 A.2d 44,51 (2007).
31
101 Md. 39, 60 A. 452 (1905).
32
Id. at 40,60 A. at 453.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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exercising the right of peremptory challenge.,,37 In concluding that the
trial court had properly refused to ask the requested question, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland relied on English common law:

In Regina v. Stewart, the headnote is as follows: "Where a party
has the right of challenge, he is not entitled to ask a juryman
questions for the purpose of eliciting whether it would be
expedient to exercise such right." The defendants were indicted
for larceny of goods from tradesmen. The prisoners' counsel, as
each juryman came to the box, asked him whether he was a
member of an association for the prosecution of parties
committing frauds on tradesmen. Baron Alderson said: "It is
quite a new course to catechise a jury in this way." Counsel said:
"I have a right, my lord, to challenge; and I submit that I am
entitled to ask for information that is necessary for the effective
exercise of that right." To which Baron Alderson replied: "I
cannot allow you to cross-examine the jury. If you like to
challenge absolutely, you may do so." In Regina v. Dowling, "the
prisoner's counsel, upon a juror being called to the box, required
him to be sworn on the voir dire, in order that he might examine
him with a view to a challenge if necessary." Erie, J., said: "You
cannot do that without first stating some ground for the
proceeding." To which counsel replied: "I cannot say I have any
instructions with regard to this particular individua1." And the
judge said: "Then I must refuse your application, unless, indeed,
you can quote some authority upon the subject. I think it a very
unreasonable thing that a juryman should be cross-examined,
without your having received any information respecting him. ,,38
The appellate courts of Maryland have cited the Handy case numerous
times-as recently as 2006 39-in support of Maryland's strict adherence
to a voir dire process limited to questions that will reveal grounds for
disqualification. 40 Indeed, in Davis v. State,41 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland claimed: "Nearly ninety years ago this Court, in Handy v. State
. . struck . . . a policy balance and established the general principles
Handy, 101 Md. at 40, 60 A. at 453.
ld. (internal citations omitted).
39
Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593,602, 903 A.2d 922, 928 (2006).
40
See, e.g., Dingle v. State, 361 Md. I, 32, 759 A.2d 819, 836 (2000); Davis v. State,
333 Md. 27, 41, 633 A.2d 867, 874 (1993); Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 341, 378 A.2d
1338, 1340 (1977); McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58-59, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959); Bryant v.
State, 207 Md. 565, 582, 115 A.2d 502, 509 (1955); Emery v. Asher, 196 Md. 1,7-8,75 A.2d
333,336 (1950); Beck v. State, 151 Md. 615,620, 135 A. 410, 412 (1926); Whittemore v.
State, 151 Md. 309,312-16, 134 A. 322,322-24 (1926).
41
333 Md. 27,40,633 A.2d 867, 873-74 (1993).
37

38
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governing the scope of voir dire in Maryland." Given the significant
influence of the holding of a case more than one century old regarding the
scope of voir dire in today's practice, close scrutiny of that case is in
order.
The English cases relied on by the Handy court, Regina v. Stewarf 2
and Regina v. Dowling,43 were decided in 1845 and 1848, respectively.
This is important because, at that time, "challenges to the ... [individual
jurors were] reduced to four heads by Sir Edward Coke: propter honoris
respectum; propter defectum; propter affectum; and propter delictum.,,44
"Propter honoris respectum" referred to a juror who was a member of
Parliament and was, therefore, subject to challenge for that reason by
himself or either party. 45 A challenge ''propter defectum" was made
when a juror was unqualified to serve under a particular statute. 46 A juror
could also be challenged for ''propter affectum," which was on "suspicion
of bias or partiality.,,47 There were two classes of challenges under
''propter affectum:" a principal challenge or a challenge to the favour. 48
Blackstone explains the principal challenge as:
[S]uch, where the cause assigned carries with it prima facie
evident marks of suspicion, either of malice or favour: as, that a
juror is of kin to either party within the ninth degree; that he has
been arbitrator on either side; that he has an interest in the cause;
that there is an action depending between him and the party; that
he has taken money for his verdict; that he has formerly been a
juror in the same cause; that he is the party's master, servant,
counsellor, steward, or attorney, or of the same society or
corporation with him: all these are principal causes of challenge;
which, if true, cannot be overruled ....49
A challenge to the favour occurred when a party, with no principal
objection, "object[ ed] [to] only some probable circumstances of
suspicion, as acquaintance and the like.,,50 The last challenge, ''propter
delictum," was permitted when a juror had "some crime or misdemeanour
that affect[ed] the juror's credit, and render[ed] him infamous.,,51
Regarding a challenge "to the favour," once made, its validity "[had to]

42

43

44
45

46
47
48
49

Regina v. Stewart, 1 Eng. Rep. 174 (1845).
Regina v. Dowling, 3 Eng. Rep. 509 (1848).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361.

ld.
ld. at *362.
ld. at *363.
ld.
ld.

50

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *363.

51

ld.

2010]

Anonymous Juries and Maryland's Limited Voir Dire

237

be left to the determination of friars, whose office it [wa]s to decide
whether the juror be favourable or unfavourable. The triors ... are two
indifferent persons named by the court. ,,52
The most salient feature of each of these challenges is that they had to
be interposed before any examination of the challenged juror could take
place. 53 In other words, the basis for the challenge had to be known prior
to any questioning of the juror. Thus, in the Dowling case, the
defendant's counsel requested that a juror be sworn on his voir dire so
that counsel could examine him "with a view to a challenge if
necessary.,,54 The judge refused to permit such a procedure, noting it was
"a very unreasonable thing that a juryman should be cross-examined
without your having received any information respecting him.,,55
Similarly, in Stewart, a case involving a charge of larceny from a
tradesman, counsel sought to question each juror about possible
membership in an association promoting the prosecution of those
committing fraud against tradesmen. 56 The court refused to allow it,
stating, "I cannot allow you to cross-examine the jury . . .. If you like to
challenge absolutely, you may do SO.,,57 It may seem counter-intuitive to
require support for a challenge to a juror without allowing questioning of
the juror to gather the support. However, it is a plainly rational procedure
if counsel are well informed about the jurors in advance of jury selection.
At the time Dowling and Stewart were decided, especially in comparison
to today, the accused and his counsel were indeed well informed about
the jurorS. 58 Therefore, seeking to question the juror further, without
basis, truly could be considered a "fishing" expedition.
The development of the trial by jury in criminal cases has a "long
tradition [of] attaching great importance to the concept of relying on a
body of one's peers to determine guilt or innocence as a safeguard against
arbitrary law enforcement.,,59 The development of what we consider a
jury trial today began in the time of Henry II:
Originally the jurors [were] called in, not in order that they may
hear, but in order that they may give, evidence. They are
witnesses. They are the neighbours of the parties; they are
presumed to know before they come into court the facts about
which they are to testify. They are chosen by the sheriff to
52
53
54
55
56
57

58
59

Id.
Id. at *365.
Regina v. Dowling, 3 Eng. Rep. 509,510 (1848).
Id.
Regina v. Stewart, 1 Eng. Rep. 174, 175 (1845).
Id.
See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970).
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represent the neighbourhood . . . and the neighbourhood . . . will
know the facts.
In the twelfth century population was sparse, and men really knew
far more of the doings of their neighbours . . .. It was expected
that all legal transactions would take place in public ... [as] every
three weeks a court was held in the village, and all the affairs of
every villager were discussed. 60
Jurors in the dual role of witness and juror slowly fell out of use given
the growing population and increasing complexities of life, which made
performing both functions difficult. 61 What grew out of this was the use
of two groups of jurors: one to investigate and charge the crime (the
grand jury of today) and the other to hear and judge the facts (today's
petit jury).62 Coming full circle to the earlier discussion of the cases
relied upon in Handy, it is clear that examining a juror on his voir dire
before making a challenge was foreign to the judge because the defendant
already knew everything about his neighbors, the jurors. 63 Thus, it is not
surprising that the judge would require the defendant to first make his
challenge, and if it be "for favour," an examination of the juror would
take place by the trior.
Since Handy, Maryland courts have essentially relied on reasoning
tied to the state of affairs in mid-nineteenth century England to hold that,
unless the judge exercises his discretion to so allow, a defendant is
precluded from questioning a juror to aid in the intelligent exercise of
peremptories. 64 At a time when a defendant was well versed in the affairs
of his juror-neighbors, this reasoning admittedly made sense. But to
apply the reasoning of Stewart and Dowling (by way of Handy) today,
when even England's handling of juries adjusted due to the "growing
population and increasing complexities oflife," goes too far.
B. Inconsistent Application of Voir Dire Precedent
1. Questions ofLaw

Maryland has generally clung to the notion that the only types of
questions a defendant may ask of a juror on voir dire are those that will

60
FREDERIC w. MAITLAND & FRANCIS c. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 56-57 (James Colby ed., AMS Press Inc. 1978) (1915).
61
Id. at 57.
62
Charles L. Wells, The Origin a/the Petty Jury, 27 L.Q. REv. 347,347,357 (1911).
63
See also THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 142 (3d ed., Luke
Hanford & Sons 1808) ("The panel is made out and known to the parties long before the trial .
. . and if they find anything which destroys the competency of a juror, they may be prepared to
prove it.").
64
Supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
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reveal a basis for disqualification. 65 The courts have, however, been
inconsistent in their application of this principle. For example, in McGee
v. State,66 the defendant was convicted of a murder arising out of a fight
with the victim. McGee interposed a theory of self-defense. 67 During
voir dire, McGee requested that the court ask several questions, all of
which were denied, and one of which asked, "are you willing to resolve
all reasonable doubt in favor of the accused?,,68 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to
"refus[e] to ask ... for[, among other things,] the juror's opinion on the
law.,,69
Conversely, in Corens v. State/o "the State's Attorney requested the
court to ask each prospective juror on his voir dire whether he would be
willing to convict on circumstantial evidence in a case where the penalty
might be death, inasmuch as the State expected to prove the commission
of the crime by circumstantial evidence." The trial court granted the
State's request, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland, on appeal, found
no error, holding that "the State has the right to challenge a juror in a
capital case on the ground that he would not be willing to convict on
circumstantial evidence.,,71 The court reasoned that "an examination of a
prospective juror on his voir dire is proper as long as it is conducted
strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect
to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly
influence him."n Both McGee and Corens involved questions about a
juror's ability to follow the law, yet resulted in opposite conclusions. 73
2. Questions Regarding a Juror's Relationships
In Alexander v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co., 74 the plaintiff, a liquidator of
the Keystone Indemnity Exchange, brought suit against the defendant, a
Maryland corporation seeking payment for assessments. Alexander
sought, and was denied, the opportunity to have the jurors asked "whether
or not they, or any of their immediate families, are assessables in the
ld.
219 Md. 53, 56, 146 A.2d 194,195 (1959).
67 Jd. at 57,146 A.2d at 195.
68
Id. at 58, 146 A.2d at 196.
69
Id. at 59, 146 A.2d at 197.
70
185 Md. 561, 563,45 A.2d 340, 343 (1946).
71
ld. at 564, 45 A.2d at 344.
72 !d., 45 A.2d at 343.
73
See also Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 160-67,923 A.2d 44,52-56 (2007) (finding no
abuse of discretion in not giving a number of questions, one of which concerned the burden of
proof); State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 396400, 906 A.2d 374, 385-87 (2006) (finding no abuse
of discretion when the trial judge refused to ask an improperly phrased question regarding the
Not Criminally Responsible defense).
74
181 Md. 415, 416-17, 30 A.2d 757, 758 (1943).
65

66
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The Court of Appeals reversed,

The fact that a prospective juror in the instant case was an
'assessable,' or that a member of his immediate family was an
'assessable,' in the Keystone Indemnity Exchange, would in our
opinion, create such bias or prejudice in his mind, that he could
not reasonably be expected to decide between the parties with
absolute impartiality, and no one could predict to which side his
bias or prejudice would incline him.76
A similar issue arose in Whittemore v. State,77 where the defendant,
who was charged with killing a prison guard, wished to question the
jurors about their occupations. Arguing before the Court of Appeals, he
noted, "conceivably, [a juror] may have been a former penitentiary guard,
and because of that fact unfitted to render an impartial verdict on a charge
of murder of a guard by a prisoner.,,78 The Court of Appeals found no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the defendant's request,
concluding:
The questions excluded in this case were for no specified purpose,
and apparently with no question of disqualification in mind, but
were merely beginning a process of examining at large, in order
to form impressions and preferences, which, while they might
properly be made the ground of peremptory challenges, would not
test the eligibility of the jurymen. 79
The questions in Whittemore and Alexander go to the same issue-the
status of the juror in direct relation to the issue at hand-yet, the court
again reaches opposing conclusions.
The passage of time has not reduced the confusion. In fact, in some
ways it has worsened. For example, Davis v. State 80 involved a police
officer, who, after witnessing the sale of a controlled dangerous substance
by the defendant, arrested him. As such, much of the defendant's case
rested on the issue of the police officer's credibility. 81 As a result,
defense counsel requested that jurors be asked "whether anyone on the
jury has been a member or is a member of the law enforcement
community or whether they have a close relative or friend who is such a

7S

76
77
78
79

80
81

Id. at 417,30 A.2d at 758.
Id. at 419,30 A.2d at 759.
151 Md. 309, 311-12, 134 A. 322, 322-23 (1926).
/d. at 314,134 A. at 323-24.
Id. at 315-16,134 A. at 324.
333 Md. 27, 32, 633 A.2d 867,869-70 (1993).
Id. at 35, 633 A.2d at 871.
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member[?],,82 The majority opinion found no abuse of discretion in the
refusal to ask the question. 83 In its analysis, the majority cited Be4ford v.
State,84 despite the fact that the Bedford court established a very broad
scope of permissible questioning in voir dire. Specifically, the court in
Bedford held that "the defendant must be afforded every opportunity to
'size up' his jury and to fully examine each juror so as to assist counsel in
determining which jurors should be disqualified for cause or even for no
cause at all.,,85 Granted, Bedford involved depriving the defendant of an
opportunity to assist counsel in the voir dire by seating him at a distance
from counsel, precluding their communication. 86 However, even if the
broad test announced in Bedford is not applicable to Davis, surely
Alexander should control, as there is little difference between
Alexander's desire to ask jurors if any were assessables of the defendant
corporation and Davis' wish to ask jurors if any were members of--or
affiliated with members of-the law enforcement community on whom
the state's case hinged.
Further adding to the confusion, th~ Davis court cited with approval
Langley v. State,87 for the proposition, "where a principal part of the
State's evidence is testimony of a police officer diametrically opposed to
that of a defendant, it is prejudicial error to fail to propound a question"
asking "[i]s there anyone here who would give more credit to the
testimony of a police officer over that of a civilian, merely because of his
status as a police officer?,,88 The questions requested by Davis and
Langley sought the exact same information. The only discemable
difference is the fact that it would have required Davis to ask one
additional question in order to get to the same information Langley was
able to obtain with one question. Quibbling over the inexactitude of a
question hardly seems appropriate when the right involved is that of an
impartial jury, the right known as "the very palladium of free
govemment.,,89 Aside from the questionable result given its citation of
authority, the Davis majority makes the remarkable statement that "we
will continue to follow the principles adopted in Handy and Whittemore
and applied consistently for the greater part of this century.,,90 The only

82
83

Id. at 33, 633 A.2d at 870.
Id. at 33-34, 633 A. 2d at 870.

84

317 Md. 659, 566 A.2d 111 (1989).

85

Id. at 673, 566 A.2d at 118.
Id. at 668-75, 566 A.2d at 116-19.

86
87

281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977).

88

Id. at 338, 349, 378 A.2d at 1338, 1344.

89
THE FEDERALIST No. 83,407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge Uni.
Press 2003).
90 Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 46, 633 A.2d 867, 876 (1993) (emphasis added).
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consistency in this area of the law in Maryland is that it is inconsistently
applied.

3. Questions Regarding Jurors' Ability to Remain Impartial
The Court of Appeals of Maryland took up another voir dire case,
Dingle v. State,91 in 2000. At trial, Dingle sought to have a series of
questions asked regarding the status of the jurors, e.g.:
1) experience as a victim of crime; 2) experience as an accused or
convicted person; 3) experience as a witness in a criminal case; 4)
experience as a petit juror in a criminal case or as a member of a
grand jury; 5) membership in any victims' rights group; 6)
connection with the legal profession; and 7) association with law
enforcement. 92
The trial court agreed to propound the questions; however, the judge
'join[ed] with each of [Dingle's] requested inquiries ... an inquiry into
whether the experience or association posited would affect the
prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial.,,93 No doubt, by
asking a single question incorporating the juror's ability to remain
impartial, the trial judge was attempting to comport with Davis, which
reiterated the mandate that questions "focus on the venire person's ability
to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented.,,94
The judge instructed the jurors to listen to the two-part questions and only
stand if his or her response to the question was affirmative. 95 Thus, jurors
were to engage in a "self-assessment" of their impartiality.
The Court of Appeals reversed,96 but in doing so, managed to muddy
the waters even further. The majority admitted that there is "a conflict
between keeping the voir dire process limited and the goal of ferreting
out cause for disqualification,,,97 but emphasized that "Maryland has
adopted, and continues to adhere to, limited voir dire. ,,98 With this
statement the court seems to make clear that the voir dire process in
Maryland remains restricted solely to questions that will reveal a reason
for disqualification and is not to aid in the exercise of peremptory strikes.
If only it were that simple. A mere three pages later, the majority held:
"[T]he strike for cause process encompasses the situation where
the motion to strike is made on the basis of information developed
91
92
93
94

95
96
97

98

361 Md. 1,759 A.2d 819 (2000).
Id. at 3 n.3, 759 A.2d at 820 n.3.
/d. at 3-4, 759 A.2d at 820.
Davis, 333 Md. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872.
Dingle, 361 Md. at 5, 759 A.2d at 821.
Jd. at 8-9, 759 A.2d at 823.
Id. at 14,759 A.2d at 826.
Id. at 13, 759 A.2d at 826.
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during the voir dire process, not simply where the prospective
juror admits an inability to be fair and impartial." ... The ability
to challenge for cause is empty indeed if no way is provided for
developing or having access to relevant information. 99
If, in fact, Dingle changed the course of voir dire jurisprudence in
Maryland by expanding the types of questions that can be asked beyond
those solely for disqualification, it was short-lived. In Curtin v. State, 100
an armed robbery case where the weapon of choice was a handgun, the
court found no abuse of discretion in failing to ask: "Does anyone have
any strong feelings concerning the use of handguns that they would be
unable to render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence?" A
majority of the Court of Appeals rationalized its holding by noting that
the defendant's theory of defense was that he was not involved in the
robbery or, in the alternative, that the gun used was not real. 101 Thus, Mr.
Curtin was hoisted with his own petard.
4. Statutory Jury Requirements

Lastly, the Court of Appeals has also delivered confusing holdings in
Boyd v. State 102 and Owens v. State. 103 These cases bear mentioning as
yet another reflection of the yo-yo treatment of permissible voir dire
questions in Maryland. In Boyd, the defendant requested that the jurors
be asked whether anyone had a physical impairment that would hinder
performance as a juror. 104 The Court of Appeals reiterated the general
law that the sole purpose of voir dire in Maryland is to discover any cause
for disqualification. 105 By statute, a physical impairment that hinders
performance as a juror is a cause for disqualification completely unrelated
to bias or partiality. 106 Yet, the court determined that there was no
reversible error because "the identification of someone with a physical
disability in no way automatically leads to the individual's
disqualification.,,107 Furthermore, the court reasoned,
[t]he identification of potential jurors who may have a physical
infirmity impairing their ability to be jurors, and the subsequent
determination by the jury judge or jury commissioner that a
99
[d. at 17-18,759 A.2d at 828 (partially quoting Davis, 333 Md. at 63,633 A.2d at 885
(Bell, J. dissenting)) (emphasis added).
100 393 Md. 593, 597, 613, 903 A.2d 922, 925, 934 (2006).
101 ·ld. at 611,903 A.2 at 933.
102
341 Md. 431, 671 A.2d 33 (1996).
103
399 Md. 388, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007).
104 Boyd, 341 Md. at 434, 671 A.2d at 34.
105
ld. at 435,671 A.2d at 35.
106 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-103(b)(4) (2006).
107
Boyd, 341 Md. at 440, 671 A.2d at 3 7 (emphasis added).
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potential juror is in fact "incapable" of rendering "satisfactory"
jury service, shall occur before the potential juror appears for jury
service through the information contained in the juror
qualification form. 108
So, even though a juror can be disqualified under Maryland's statute ifhe
or she is physically impaired to such a degree as to affect his or her
ability to be a juror, the court made clear that this sort of determination is
taken care of by virtue of juror questionnaires sent to all potential jurors
along with a second check made by the jury commissioner. 109
Ten years after Boyd, Adeyemi Alade, a non-citizen, improperly
served on the jury that convicted Marcus Owens of second degree
murder. I10 Mr. Alade's foreign citizenship was not revealed until after
the trial, at which time Mr. Alade called the jury commissioner after
learning of the citizenship requirement to sit as a juror. IliOn appeal,
Owens argued that he had a statutory right to have a jury of only U.S.
citizens and, given the clear holding in Boyd, which mandated that
defendants have no right to a voir dire question concerning the statutory
requirements to serve on a jury, any request by Owens for a voir dire
question regarding citizenship would have been futile. I12 Owens also
stressed that, under Boyd, he was entitled to rely on the jury selection
process that occurs before potential jurors enter the court. l13 The court
rejected these arguments and held:
Simply because it is not mandatory for a judge to pose a
particular question does not make it a prohibited question. Had
Owens sought, and the trial judge refused, a citizenship question
in the present case, the propriety of the denial would have been
preserved for appellate review as an abuse of discretion. But
because Owens did not suggest the question, he may not complain
reasonably that a non-citizen was empanelled on his jury. 114
Mercifully, the court in Owens partially overruled Boyd in stating that a
citizenship question could have been asked and preserved for appellate
review;115 however, it did Owens no favor as the court found that Owens

108
109
110
III

Id. at 442-43,671 A.2d at 39.
Id.
Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 397, 400, 924 A.2d 1072, 1077-78 (2007).
Id. at 400, 924 A.2d at 1078; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-102(a)

(2006).
112
1\3
114
115

Owens, 399 Md. at 420,924 A.2d at 1090-91.
Id. at 421, 924 A.2d at 1091.
Id. at 422,924 A.2d at 1092 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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had waived any right to complain. 116 Ah, "[ t]or 'tis the sport to have the
engineer [hJoist with his own petard. ,,117
5. Maryland is Out of Touch with the Rest of the Country
It is fair to say that, while these cases have resulted in a head-spinning

hodgepodge of rulings, the court continues to insist that it is being guided
by one bedrock principle: "In Maryland, the sole purpose of voir dire is to
ensure a fair and impartial jury by determining the existence of cause for
disqualification, and not as in many other states, to include the intelligent
exercise of peremptory challenges.,,118 By adhering to this principle,
Maryland is in the minority, as most states permit both the prosecutor and
the defense counsel to ask questions of the venire that will aid counsel in
making peremptory challenges. I 19 In fact, of those states that have
ld.
117
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 4.
118
Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 158-59,923 A.2d 44, 51 (2007) (citing State v. Logan,
394 Md. 378,396,906 A.2d 374, 384 (2006)); State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 207, 798 A.2d
566,569 (2002); Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 676, 637 A.2d 117, 125 (1994).
119
The following states permit an expanded voir dire: Alabama, Ex Parte Dobyn, 805
So.2d 763 (Ala. 2001); Alaska, Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Arizona,
State v. Melendez, 588 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1978); Arkansas, Hutcheson v. State, 213 S.W.3d 25
(Ark. Ct. App. 2005); Colorado, Oglesby v. Conger, 507 P.2d 883 (Colo. App. 1972);
Connecticut, State v. Ebron, 975 A.2d 17 (Conn. 2009); Delaware, Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d
285 (De\. 2005); Florida, Solorzano v. State, 2009 WL 3787196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009);
Georgia, Allen v. State, 659 S.E.2d 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Hawaii, State v. Altergatt, 559
P.2d 728 (Haw. 1977); Idaho, State v. Larsen, 923 P.2d 1001 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996); Illinois,
People v. Dixon, 887 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Indiana, Perryman v. State, 830 N.E.2d
1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Iowa, State v. Tubbs, 690 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 2005); Kentucky,
Fields v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 375 (Ky. 2008); Louisiana, State v. Constance, 2009
WL 3853163 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Fudge, 481 N.E.2d 199
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Michigan, People v. Vesnaugh, 340 N.W.2d 651 (Mich. Ct. App. 83);
Minnesota, State v. Ritter, 719 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Mississippi, Jordan v.
State, 995 So.2d 94 (Miss. 2008); Missouri, Care & Treatment of Wolfe v. State, 291 S.W.3d
829 (Mo. 2009); Montana, Whitlow v. State, 183 P.3d 861 (Mont. 2008); Nebraska, State v.
Shipps, 656 N.W.2d 622 (Neb. 2003); Nevada, Whitlock v. Salmon, 752 P.2d 210 (Nev.
1988); New Hampshire, State v. Goding, 474 A.2d 580 (N.H. 1984); New Jersey, State v.
Tinnes, 877 A.2d 313 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); New Mexico, Sutherlin v. Fenenga,
810 P.2d 353 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); New York, People v. Corbett, 418 N.Y.S.2d 699 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979); North Carolina, State v. Cummings, 648 S.E.2d 788 (N.C. 2007); Ohio,
Eickenberry v. McFall, 36 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941); Oklahoma, Sanchez v. State,
2009 WL 4797497 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009); Oregon, State v. Williams, 860 P.2d 860 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993); South Carolina, State v. Wise, 596 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 2004); South Dakota, State
v. Fool Bull, 766 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 2009); Tennessee, Wallis v. State, 546 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn.
Crim. App. f976); Texas, Unista v. Bed, Bath Beyond Inc., 245 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. Ct. App.
2007); Utah, Alcazar v. Univ. of Utah Hosp. & Clinics, 188 P.3d 490 (Utah Ct. App. 2008);
Vermont, Fowlie v. McDonald, 82 A. 677 (Vt. 1912); Washington, State v. Wilson, 555 P.2d
1375 (Wash. Ct.App. 1976); West Virginia, State ex rei Nationwide Mutual v. Karl, 664
S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 2008); Wyoming, Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052 (Wyo. 1992).
Virginia provides that it is within the trial judge's discretion to allow questioning in aid of
exercising peremptory challenges. Davis v. Sykes, 121 S.E.2d 513 (Va. 1961).
116
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addressed the issue, only California,120 Pennsylvania,121 and Maryland 122
limit voir dire to questioning solely for the purpose of determining causes
for disqualification. Additionally, every federal circuit permits expanded
voir dire. 123 In attempting to decipher all of this, the bottom line is that,
at best, Maryland's appellate courts continue to restrict voir dire in
criminal cases and, at worst, litigants will be perpetually uncertain of
what is and is not permitted on voir dire.
III. THE CASE AGAINST ANONYMOUS JURIES
"Knowledge is power."

-Sir Francis Bacon 124
There are several constitutional and statutory arguments that one can
make against the use of anonymous juries in Maryland. First, statutes in
Maryland governing jury selection require that access to juror
information, including name and address, be provided to the parties in the
case. 125 In Maryland criminal cases, a party may challenge the entire jury
array from which the sworn jury is to be chosen,126 or may challenge an
individual juror for cause. 127 Specifically, with respect to a challenge to
the array, the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland
Code provides that "[o]n a showing that a party needs access to a record
to prepare for a hearing on a motion pending [to the array] ... a trial
judge may allow the party to inspect and copy a record as needed to
prepare.,,128 Additionally, with respect to a challenge to an individual

120
CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 223 (2009) ("Examination of prospective jurors shall be
conducted only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause.").
121
Dep't of Gen. Servs. GS v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 927 A.2d 717 (pa. 2007).
122 Supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
123
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 432 (1991) ("Voir dire examination serves the dual
purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising
peremptory challenges."); United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 32, 34 n.19 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Salameh, 152 F3d 88, 121 (2d Cir. 1998); Gov't of the V.I. v. Felix, 569 F.2d
1274,1277 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 738 (4th Cir. 1996);
Knox v. Collins, 928 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815,
822 (6th Cir. 1983); Alcala v. Emhart Indus., 495 F.3d 360, 363 (7th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948, 957 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132,
1139 (9th Cir. 1996); Photostat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783, 786 (lOth Cir. 1964); Cummings
v. Dugger, 862 F.2d 1504, 1507 (11 th CiT. 1989); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,
496 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24{a) (2009).
124
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND
PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 168 (Nathan
Haskell Dole ed., 10th ed., Blue Ribbon Books Inc. 1919).
125
See, e.g., Md. Rule 4-312(c)(1).
126
Md. Rule 4-312(a)(3).
127
Md. Rule 4-312(d)(2).
128
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-409(c) (2006).
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juror during jury selection, Maryland Rule 4_312,129 which governs jury
selection in criminal cases, provides:
Before the examination of qualified jurors, each party shall be
provided with a list that includes each juror's name, address, age,
sex, education, occupation, spouse's occupation, and any other
information required by Rule. Unless the trial judge orders
otherwise, the address shall be limited to the city or town and zip
code and shall not include the street address or box number. 130
Further, the rule allows "[a] party [to] provide the jury list to any
person employed by the party to assist in jury selection." 13 1 The trial
judge may prohibit a party from disseminating the list "to any other
person.,,132 Moreover, subsection (d) expressly states that "[o]n request
of any party, the judge shall direct the clerk to call the roll of the array
and to request each qualified juror to stand and be identified when
called.,,133 And lastly, subsection (f)(I) provides that "[t]he individuals to
be impaneled as sworn jurors, including any alternates, shall be called
from the qualified jurors remaining on the jury list in the order previously
designated by the judge and shall be sworn."l34 These rules and statutes
leave little doubt about the defendant's right to be provided with juror
information prior to jury selection. The rules are not recommendations.
They are precise rubrics that leave no discretion. The use of the word
"shall" throughout these rules reflects their mandatory nature. Finally,
the fact that Rule 4-312(c)(1) specifically requires the deletion of the
juror's specific address, instead allowing access to the city, town, and zip
code, strongly suggests that the Court of Appeals has considered and
determined that a juror's address is the only information that can be kept
from a defendant in a criminal trial.
People v. Watts,135 a case out of New York, is instructive. In Watts,
the State sought to empanel an anonymous jury over the defendant's
objection that doing so would violate the Criminal Procedure Law of
New York. 136 The defendant referred to a law, which provided that "the
Maryland Rules have the force of law. MD. CODE ANN., CON ST. art. 4, § 18(a) (2003).
Md. Rule 4-312(c)(I) (emphasis added).
131
Md. Rule 4-312(c)(2)(A).
132
Md. Rule 4-312(c)(2)(B).
133
Md. Rule 4-312( d) (emphasis added).
134
Md. Rule 4-312(1)(1) (emphasis added). Throughout the rules governing jury
selection, reference is made to the requirement of "calling" each qualified juror. See Md.
Rules 4-312, 4-313. In addition, the rule governing access to records provides that, unless
ordered otherwise by a judge and upon request, "[a] custodian shall ... disclose the names and
zip codes of the sworn jurors contained on a jury list after the jury has been impaneled and
sworn." Md. Rule 16-1004.
135 661 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. Sup. 1997).
136 Id. at 770.
129
130
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court shall direct that the names of not less than twelve members of the
panel be drawn and called.,,137 The State contended that the statute did
not create a substantive right but was merely a rule of procedure for jury
selection. 138 In response to this argument, the court pointed out that a
separate section of the rule allowed the court "for good cause shown" to
issue a protective order "regulating disclosure of the . . . residential
address of any prospective or sworn juror.,,139 Reading the two sections
in conjunction, the court held that the section regarding the juror's
address must have been added to give the judge discretion to limit public
disclosure of the address; however, the failure of the legislature to add the
same discretion in the section concerning juror names indicates a
conscious decision to remove any discretion on the court's part that
would allow withholding juror names. 140 Like Watts, defendants in
Maryland have statutes and rules clearly reflecting a preference for
disclosure.
Maryland also adheres to the "common law principle of openness
regarding public access to court proceedings and court records.,,141
Speaking for the Court of Appeals in The Baltimore Sun, Co. v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, a case involving the closing of a courtroom to
the public and the sealing of court documents, Judge Eldridge stated:
The common law principle of openness is not limited to the trial
itself but applies generally to court proceedings and documents ...
. This "legacy of open justice" traveled to America and became an
. intrinsic element of early colonial governments .... In Maryland,
"the rules of the common law of England were ... adopted as the
principles which were to direct the proceedings of the provincial
government, whether legislative or judicial . . . ." . . . The
common law rule that court proceedings, records, and documents
are open to the public is fully applicable in Maryland except to
the extent that the principle has been modified by legislative
enactments or decisions by this Court. Consequently, the trial
judge ... could properly have closed the courtroom and issued
the sealing order only if authorized by statutes, rules promulgated
by this Court, or decisions of this Court modifying the common
law principle under specified circumstances. 142

138

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

137

Baltimore Sun Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 660, 755
A.2d 1130, 1134 (2000) (citing Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert, 323 Md. 290, 302-06, 593 A.2d
224,230-32 (1991)).
142
/d. at 661-62, 755 A.2d at 1134-35.
141
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There is no statute or decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
that modifies this common law principle, fully applicable in this state, 143
in regard to anonymous juries. 144 To be sure, there are certain scenarios
that allow for the closure of courtroom proceedings; however, none
address concealing identifying information of jurors from the parties. 145
And, quite to the contrary, there are Maryland Rules, cited above, that
enforce the common law principle of openness, particularly with respect
to juror information. 146
A defendant's right to a public trial as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights is "vital to a fair administration of
justice.,,147 As was stated in Estes v. Texas,148 "the publictrial guarantee
embodies a view of human nature, true as a general rule, that judges,
lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will perform their respective functions
more responsibly in an open court than in secret proceedings.,,149 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[n]o right ranks higher
than the right of the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the
143
Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 5 entitIes "the Inhabitants of Maryland ... to
the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and
to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen
hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local
and other circumstances, ... subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal
by, the Legislature of this State." MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5
(2009).
144
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had occasion to address the denial of
access for the Baltimore Sun to the jury list in a case involving the trial of one of the
defendants involved in the savings and loan debacle. In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74
(4th Cir. 1988). The court held that "the risk of loss of confidence of the public in the judicial
process is too great to permit a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose members may
maintain anonymity. If the district court thinks that the attendant dangers of a highly
publicized trial are too great, it may always sequester the jury; and change of venue is always
possible as a method of obviating pressure or prejudice." Id. at 76. However, in a footnote
the court acknowledged that it was not addressing a case "in which there existed realistic
threats of violence or jury corruption." /d. at 76 n.5
145
In order to preclude individuals from a courtroom, "[t]he trial court must find
specifically that no reasonable alternative short of closure of the courtroom will protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial." Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert, 323 Md. 290, 303, 593 A.2d
224,230 (1991) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 u.S. 555, 580-81 (1980);
Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md. 68, 82, 465 A.2d 426, 434 (1983». To
determine if prejudice is substantially probable from an open hearing, the court is to look "into
the extent of publicity that the case has received and is likely to receive after the hearing ...
the nature of the information that will be made public during the hearing, community reaction
to information about the defendant, the crime with which the accused is charged, and whether
closure of the courtroom will prevent the asserted prejudice." Id.
146
See Md. Rule 4-3 12(c)(I).
147
Robinson v. State, 4\0 Md. 91, 120, 976 A.2d \072, \089 (2009) (Greene, J.,
dissenting).
148
381 U.S. 532 (1965).
149
Id. at 588 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948» (Harlan, J., concurring).
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accused's right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the
community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness.,,150 The
importance of the right to a public trial cannot be overstated; nor can the
right to open voir dire proceedings:
Proceedings held in secret would deny . . . and frustrate the broad
public interest; by contrast, public proceedings vindicate the
concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that
offenders are being brought to account for their criminal conduct
by jurors fairly and openly selected. . . . Closed proceedings,
although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for
cause shown that outweighs the value of openness. 151
If it is the State that seeks to have the jury remain anonymous, "it must be
shown that the denial [of access] is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.,,152
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' APPROACH TO ANONYMOUS JURY TRIALS

"Com can't expect justice from a court composed of chickens."

-African proverb
A. Precautions to Protect the Defendant's Rights
When an anonymous jury is empanelled due to concerns for juror
safety, this may undermine a defendant's presumption of innocence and
infringe his or her Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
Recognizing these serious concerns, courts have utilized several measures
to protect the defendant's rights, including instructions to juries
suggesting that the need for anonymity is unrelated to a potential danger
to the juries. For example, in United States v. Scarfo,153 the trial judge
instructed the jury before the trial began "that they would hear testimony
about organized crime, and that he wanted them to consider the case
without any apprehension that they or their families would be
endangered" and that "anonymity was intended to protect the interests of
both the prosecution and the defense . . . to make sure that both sides get
a fair trial.,,154 Similarly, in United States v. Edmond,155 the court
instructed the jury that "[i]t is a common practice ... to keep the names
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
152
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). It is interesting
that most courts apply a different test, i.e., they require that there be a "strong reason" for
anonymity as opposed to a "compelling governmental interest." See supra note 17.
153
850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1988).
154
Id. at 1017.
155
730 F. Supp. 1144 (D.D.C. 1990).
150
151
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and identities of the jurors in confidence. This is in no way unusual. It is
a procedure being followed in this case to protect your privacy even from
the Court.,,156 These cases illustrate that an instruction, should one be
given, must be careful not to make jurors more fearful, thereby further
reducing the defendant's presumption of innocence.
B. Expanding Voir Dire

Another critical precaution taken in many cases employing
anonymous juries, and one that is the focus of this article, is the extensive
use of voir dire when selecting the jury. Even though the judge in United
States v. Barnes-the first anonymous jury case-kept the jurors' names
and addresses confidential, he permitted extensive questioning on the
jurors' counties of residence, occupations, possible racial prejudices, and
memberships in clubs or groups. 157 In United States v. Scarfo, the court
allowed written questionnaires concerning a broad range of personal
biographical information as well as "thorough" voir dire by the judge and
counsel. 158 Indeed, as is clear in all of the cases permitting anonymous
jurors:
The most important aspect of this voir dire/peremptory challenges
issue is that, when a court takes appropriate measures, attorneys
for both sides receive more material information about members
of an anonymous jury than they do in ordinary trials in which
jurors identify themselves by name and address. The Court uses
the term "material" advisedly, because "[a] trial judge is required
to permit at least some questioning with respect to any material
issue that may actually or potentially arise during the trial.,,159
The Edmond court concluded that the extensive voir dire in conjunction
with the expansive juror questionnaire "enhance [d] rather than
diminish[ ed] the defendants' rights to exercise their peremptory
challenges ... to be tried by a fair and impartial jury." 160
156
Id. at 1150 n.13. This author posits that this type of instruction can be viewed as
slightly dishonest.
157 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1979).
158
Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1022.
159
Edmond, 730 F. Supp. at 1149 (quoting United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1133
(2d Cir. 1989)).
160
Id. at 1149; see also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994)
("Where jury anonymity is warranted, the defendant's fundamental right to an unbiased jury is
sufficiently guaranteed by the court's conduct of a voir dire that can uncover any bias toward
issues in the case or to the defendant himself."); United States v. Byers, 603 F. Supp. 2d 826,
834 (D. Md. 2009) ("A defendant's right to an impartial jury is secured through the
administration of a thorough voir dire process. Perhaps the most critical consideration in this
endeavor is the need to uncover any biases against the issues or any of the defendants
involved. For this reason, measures have been taken to ensure that an especially extensive
voir dire process is conducted ....").
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CONCLUSION

In Maryland, should a rule be passed allowing for the empanelling of
anonymous juries, the extent of and reason for voir dire must be
expanded. Because the effectiveness of peremptory challenges bears a
direct relation to the breadth of information that is revealed on voir dire,
Maryland should abandon its insistence on voir dire questions limited
solely to those that would reveal a basis for disqualification and allow
questions to be asked that would aid in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. Otherwise, the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury will
remain illusory.

